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The effectiveness of institutional activism 
Caton, Gary L; Goh, Jeremy; Donaldson, Jeffrey.  
Financial Analysts Journal; Vol. 57, Iss. 4, (Jul/Aug 2001): 21-26. 
Abstract 
Researchers examined earnings-forecast revisions and stock returns after release of the Focus List of 
poorly performing companies by the Council of Institutional Investors. Using Tobin's q as a measure of a 
company's ability to improve performance, researchers found significant and positive abnormal forecast 
revisions and post-release stock returns for companies with q greater than one. Findings support the 
proposition that institutional activism is effective for underperforming companies - but only those 
companies with the ability to respond to the challenge to improve performance.  
 
 
We examined earnings-forecast revisions and stock returns after release of the Focus List of poorly 
performing companies by the Council of Institutional Investors. Using Tobin's q as a measure ofa 
company's ability to improve performance, we found significant and positive abnormal forecast revisions 
and post-release stock returns for companies with q greater than 1. For companies with q less than 1, 
neither forecast revisions nor post-release stock returns were significantly different from zero. For the full 
sample of companies on the Focus List, regression analysis showed a significant positive relationship 
between forecast revisions and postrelease stock returns. These findings support our proposition that 
institutional activism is effective for underperforming companies-but only those companies with the 
ability to respond to the challenge to improve performance.  
A subject of current debate is the effectiveness of institutional activism. Most event studies show little or 
no short-term effect on equity value when a large shareholder targets a company for a proxy proposal. For 
example, Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996) found no stock market reaction to public 
announcements of shareholder-initiated proxy proposals. Also, Wahal (1996), investigating the 
effectiveness of proxy mailings of the nine most activist pension funds in 1987-1993, reported abnormal 
returns that were not reliably different from zero for the majority of sample companies.  
Some authors have reported significant abnormal returns, however, for portions of their samples. 
Contradicting his main findings, Wahal reported a positive 2.7 percent announcement-period stock return 
on the letter date for a subsample of companies that, rather than being targets of a specific proxy proposal, 
were targeted for their poor stock market performance. Similarly, Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner (1996) 
reported a significant positive announcement-period reaction of 0.92 percent for the subsample of 
companies with whom the United Shareholders Association successfully negotiated an agreement.  
Finally, tests using long-term (that is, one year or longer) returns are inconclusive at best. Karpoff (1998), 
who presented a survey of the literature on shareholder activism, found that only two of the seven studies 
that examined the long-term effectiveness of institutional activism reported statistically significant 
returns. Moreover, he questioned the reliability of those two studies because of the methodology used. 
One of the studies, Opler and Sokobin (1995), examined the long-term stock performance of companies 
on the Focus List published by the Council of Institutional Investors and reported both improved stock-
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price performance and increases in accounting returns for companies subsequent to their appearance on 
the list. 1  
The Council of Institutional Investors is an association of more than 120 large U.S. pension fund 
management firms and nearly 110 sustaining firms (interested nonmember parties, such as investment 
management firms and non-U.S. pension fund management firms) that addresses investment issues 
affecting the performance or risk of members' invested assets. CII establishes guidelines for effective 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance and provides a number of services to members. The annual 
publication of the names of underperforming companies on the Focus List is one of the member services. 
As one might expect, appearance on the list tends to focus the attention of all CII members on the poorly 
performing company. CII's intent is that the attention will lead to a collaborative effort by members to 
compel company managers to step up efforts to improve performance.  
We tested the effectiveness of this presumed collaborative effort by examining changes in financial 
analysts' earnings forecasts and stock market returns for the companies on the Focus List on days 
surrounding release of the list. Although our sample of companies is essentially the same as that of Opler 
and Sokobin, our approach differs from theirs in several ways. First, our primary emphasis is on earnings-
forecast revisions and their relationship to short-term, rather than long-term, postrelease stock returns. 
Second, we propose that the attention provided by inclusion on the list may be good news for some 
companies and bad news for others, depending on the specific company's ability to respond to the 
challenge to improve performance. If the underperformance is a result of lack of effort or poor decision 
making at a company that would otherwise be expected to perform satisfactorily, then the new attention 
may reinvigorate effort and performance. We coin the phrase "performance slack" to describe this 
situation. That is, a company has performance slack if it was expected to perform satisfactorily but is not 
doing so for some reason. If the company was not expected to perform satisfactorily (i.e., it has no 
performance slack), the new attention provided by the Focus List may not lead to an improvement in 
performance. Finally, we formally examined the relationship between the forecast revisions and market 
reaction at the publication of the Focus List.  
Specifically, Hypothesis 1 states that the stock market reaction to release of the Focus List depends on 
whether the company has performance slack. Hypothesis 2 states that analysts account for performance 
slack when considering future cash flow estimations and revise their EPS estimates upward only for those 
companies with performance slack. Hypothesis 3 states that positive expected cash flow revisions lead to 
abnormal stock returns in the post-release period only for companies with performance slack.  
Performance Slack  
The companies in our sample were those whose equity performance over the year had been so inferior as 
to land them on the Focus List. Although the companies' stock market performances may have been 
uniformly poor, the companies were in all likelihood not equally endowed with the necessary attributes to 
improve their performance as intended by CH through publication of the list. These attributes would 
include competitive positioning, cost advantages, and/or growth opportunities. To test our hypotheses, we 
needed a measure that could distinguish between those companies in our sample that had more of these 
attributes from those with few or none. We needed a measure of performance slack.  
We decided that Tobin's q is an intuitively appealing choice for this measure. Tobin's q is the ratio of a 
company's market value of debt and equity to the replacement cost of its assets. James Tobin originally 
introduced the variable q to explain aggregate capital investment. He argued that companies have 
incentives to invest as long as marginal q is greater than 1 (see Brealey and Myers 2000). Lindenberg and 
Ross (1981) hypothesized that the premium of market value over replacement cost indicated when q is 
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greater than 1 may be the result of some company-specific factor. For example, a patent or proprietary 
production process could provide the company with an effective barrier to entry, or a superior brand 
image could provide it with a competitive sales advantage. Similarly, the company could enjoy 
competitive cost advantages derived from a superior location, economies of scale, or superior use of 
technology. In addition, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) showed theoretically that q > 1 is a necessary 
condition for a value-maximizing level of investment whereas q < 1 is a sufficient condition for 
overinvestment. Their findings imply that companies in the q > 1 group have valuable growth 
opportunities that companies in the q < 1 group do not and, therefore, have higher q values. Ultimately, 
however, whether the premium is derived from company-specific attributes or valuable growth 
opportunities, companies with q > 1 are better positioned to improve performance than companies with q 
< 1.  
The presumptions behind publication of the Focus List are that the poor stock-price performance of the 
listed companies is the result of poor managerial performance and that CII members acting in concert as 
major stockholders can force the company managers to improve performance. Because only companies 
with q > 1 have the company-specific attributes and/or growth opportunities to produce the improvement 
in performance, we defined a company in our Focus List sample to have performance slack if its 
estimated Tobin's q was greater than 1 and considered it to have no performance slack if its q ratio was 
less than 1.  
The Study  
Our original sample consisted of all 138 companies placed on the Focus List between 1991 and 1995 for 
which CRSP reported stock returns. Of this total, 30 companies were removed because they did not have 
sufficient data in the Compustat files to compute Tobin's q and 5 more were removed because they did 
not have earnings forecasts in the I/B/E/S earnings-forecast database, leaving 108 companies in the 
sample.2  
Stock Market Reaction. We computed abnormal returns as the difference between the actual return and an 
expected return generated by the market model;  
 
Following Patell (1976), we standardized and cumulated excess returns, a process that produced a 
normally distributed Z-statistic. Day 0 is the release date of the Focus List to the public. Table 1 reports 
the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) surrounding release of the Focus List for the full sample, 
the q < 1 subsample (companies without performance slack), and the q > 1 subsample (companies with 
performance slack).  
As shown in Panel A, the full sample had a significant 88-day pre-release average CAR of about -12.3 
percent. This finding agrees with that of Opler and Sokobin, who found significant underperformance in 
the 48 months and 12 months prior to the list release date. The underperformance for the five days 
surrounding the list release was similarly negative and significant. Finally, Panel A provides no evidence 
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of postannouncement drift in the 88 days after the release of the Focus List. Thus, we cannot confirm for 
the full sample the improvement in post-release performance reported by Opler and Sokobin. These 
results suggest that inclusion on the Focus List is, on average, bad news but that it somehow halts the 
slide in stock value that led to the inclusion on the list in the first place.  
Table 1.  
 
Results reported in Panels B and C suggest that a post-release improvement in stock price does occur but 
that it is limited to those companies with performance slack. First, both panels indicate significantly 
negative pre-release returns for the subsamples. But the similarities in the results of the two subsamples 
end there. The returns for the companies without performance slack were significantly negative for the 
five days surrounding the announcement period, whereas for companies with performance slack, the 
average announcement-- period CAR was not significantly different from zero. Apparently, market 
participants judge inclusion on the Focus List as bad news only for companies without performance slack. 
Furthermore, in the 88-day post-release period, the average CAR for companies with performance slack 
became a significantly positive 7.01 percent, whereas that for companies with no performance slack was 
an insignificant -0.63 percent. These event-study findings indicate that release of the Focus List starts the 
process of reevaluation for the included companies. For those companies with little chance for improved 
performance, inclusion on the Focus List is interpreted by the market as bad news initially but tends to 
stop the slide in stock performance indicated in the pre-release period. For companies with performance 
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slack, however, making the list not only stops the pre-release slide in equity values but also seems to 
mark an upturn in stock market performance, as indicated by the post-release average abnormal return. 
These findings are consistent with Hypothesis 1: Stock market reaction to release of the Focus List 
depends on whether the company has performance slack or not. In the next section, we focus on how the 
market's expectations for improved post-release performance are established for these companies.  
Basis of Analysts' Forecast Revisions. To test whether analysts revise their expectations for future cash 
flows when the Focus List is released, we needed a proxy for those expectations. With their initial 
earnings forecasts, analysts help the market set the initial level of expected cash flow for each company. 
Similarly, revisions in those forecasts help the market revise its expectations for cash flow to some new 
level. We used reported earnings-- forecast revisions after the release of the Focus List as a proxy for 
changes in analyst expectations for future cash flow. Significant positive forecast revisions on release of 
the list will be consistent with an upward revision in the market's expectations for future cash flows. If 
these revisions occur only for the companies with performance slack, then Hypothesis 2 will be 
supported.  
Following Brous (1992), we measured earnings-forecast revisions, FR, by using the following equation:  
 
 
This simple equation is not sufficient, however, to provide a proof of Hypothesis 2. O'Brien (1988) 
showed that reported earnings forecasts systematically decrease until actual EPS are announced by the 
company. Furthermore, Brous reported that analysts update their forecasts for any specific company only 
every four or five months. These two findings imply that (1) forecasters are systematically overoptimistic 
when making their first earnings forecast for a company and (2) in any given month, only about 20 
percent of forecasts are updated. Therefore, revisions in analysts' forecasts for any specific company tend 
to be serially correlated. For example, release of new positive information will cause the median earnings 
forecast to rise for up to four subsequent months as more analysts use the new information to update their 
forecasts. Obviously, to test our hypothesis that revised forecasts of cash flow are positive only for 
companies with performance slack, we needed a measure of the surprise forecast revisions after 
correcting for this serial correlation.  
To isolate the surprise revisions, we used a modified version of the Ederington and Goh (1998) procedure, 
which is, in turn, a variant of the method pioneered by Brous. We started by randomly choosing 500 
companies from the I/B/E/S data tape. For each of these companies, we randomly selected a 25-month 
period between January 1984 and December 1990 and, pooling the resulting data, estimated the following 
equation through use of a first-order Almon (1965) lag:  
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Stock Returns and Cash Flow Revisions. We formally tested for a relationship between forecast revisions 
and abnormal stock returns by using ordinary least-squares regression analysis. Specifically, we regressed 
the stock market reaction, measured by the CAR, on the cash flow revisions, measured by the four-month 
CAFR. If cash flow revisions lead to abnormal stock returns, as stated in Hypothesis 3, the coefficient on 
CAFR should be positive and significant. Given our previous results, however, performance slack may 
overshadow forecast revisions in explaining postrelease abnormal returns. To control for this possibility, 
we included in the regression a dummy variable, Dummy q, that took the value of 1 when q was greater 
than 1 and zero otherwise.  
Results for the cross-sectional regression analysis are presented in Table 3. The results for Model 1, in 
which the dependent variable is the five-day announcement-period CAR, show no relationship between 
cumulative abnormal returns and the independent variables CAFR or Dummy q. This result implies that 
at the release of the Focus List, the market does not use these particular variables to distinguish between 
the companies on the list. The result is consistent with our previous results. The results for Model 2, 
however, in which the dependent variable was the 88-day post-release CAR, show that both Dummy q 
and CAFR are significantly and positively related to the post-release cumulative abnormal return, with an 
adjusted R2 of 0.10. These findings support Hypothesis 3: Post-release abnormal returns are driven by 
cash flow revisions, even after performance slack is controlled for.  
Table 2. 
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Table 3.  
 
Conclusion  
We provided evidence that, contrary to much of the existing literature, actions by institutional investors 
do affect the equity values of the companies targeted. The effect is not the same, however, for all 
companies. Release of the CII Focus List generated an immediate negative stock market reaction for the 
companies in our sample. On publication of the list, financial analysts, however, increased their earnings 
estimates for companies with performance slack while not revising estimates for companies without 
performance slack. The increases in expected cash flows were followed by significant positive postrelease 
abnormal stock returns. For companies without performance slack, post-release stock returns were 
negative and insignificant. Finally, the regression analysis showed that post-release stock returns are 
significantly related to forecast revisions for the entire Focus List. Apparently, for this sample, the market 
expects the spotlight provided by release of the Focus List to produce positive results in companies with 
the ability to respond.  
Footnote 
Notes  
1. See www.cii.org/focus.htm.  
2. Tobin's q was calculated by using the Chung and Pruitt (1994) methodology.  
3. We used post-release returns for parameter estimation because, by definition, the pre-release stock 
returns are poor for companies included on the Focus List and use of preannouncement returns for 
estimation could bias the results. As it turns out, when we estimated the parameters using the pre-release 
period, the results were not materially affected.  
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